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Abstract:   We introduce a hybrid simulation model ('SimPachamama') designed to 
explore the complex socio-environmental trade-offs of alternative policy bundles and 
policy sequencing options for stemming deforestation and reducing poverty in tropical 
countries.  Designed and calibrated to the initial conditions of a small forest village in 
rural Bolivia, the model consists of:  (a) an optimising agricultural household module of 
heterogeneous agents that make individually optimal land-use decisions based on factor 
endowments and market conditions; (b) an encompassing general equilibrium ‘shell’ 
module that endogenously determines wages and links the agricultural labour market 
and rural-urban migration rates; and (c) a novel user-controlled policy-maker module 
that allows the user to make ‘real time’ choices over a variety of public and 
environmental policies that in turn impact land use, welfare, and migration. Over a 20-
year simulation period the results highlight trade-offs between reductions in 
deforestation and improvements in household welfare that can only be overcome either 
when international REDD payments are offered or when decentralized deforestation 
taxes are implemented. The sequencing of policies plays a critical role in the 
determination of these results. 
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1. Introduction 
For decades, deforestation and forest degradation in tropical nations have reduced 
supplies of forest ecosystem services (MEA, 2005; FAO, 2010). These losses have had 
consequences at all scales, from local to global. Forest users with incomes and 
livelihoods dependent on, e.g. watershed services, have experienced adverse effects on 
their welfare. Emissions of carbon dioxide from deforestation and forest degradation 
influence the trajectory of anthropogenic climate change with welfare implications for 
future generations across the globe (Stern, 2008). Yet, policies which aim to conserve 
forests, such as protected areas, can also adversely affect the welfare of the forest-
dependent poor, for instance, by restricting their access to natural resources (Barrett et 
al., 2011). Evidence is also emerging of how measures to improve welfare, such as anti-
poverty programs, can induce environmental change, for example deforestation through 
increasing the local consumption and production of agricultural commodities (see Alix-
Garcia et al., 2013). 
In response, policy makers have increasingly sought to design interventions which not 
only aim to conserve forests but also improve the incomes and livelihoods of forest 
users (e.g., see Merger et al., 2011; Ollivier, 2012; Groom and Palmer, 2012). Targeted 
towards agents of deforestation, interventions such as payments for environmental 
services (PES) and the provision of off-farm labour opportunities could, under certain 
conditions, enhance their welfare as well as conserve forests (Groom and Palmer, 2010, 
2014). Though multiple impacts are rarely evaluated together, a growing body of 
empirical research suggests variable outcomes from such policies (e.g. Shively and 
Pagiola, 2004; Groom et al., 2010). Beyond these effects, where external interventions 
necessitate public and/or private funding, there are also likely to be wider policy and 
welfare implications that may only be observed in a general equilibrium setting.  
In this paper, we examine potential trade-offs in policy outcomes with a focus on two 
design features that help to better understand dynamic policy interactions: ‘policy 
bundles’ and policy sequencing. The former refers to combinations of policies that all, to 
some extent, impact on land-use decision making while the latter refers to the order in 
which policies are implemented. We incorporate these two features into a landscape- 
(or village-) scale model based on the structural, cultural and institutional features of a 
typical Bolivian frontier forest village, and we allow the model user, in the role of a local 
policymaker (‘the Mayor’), the opportunity not only to implement policy bundles but 
also to react to the consequences of her policy choices over time. Thus, policy 
parameters can be changed and new policies can be implemented. 
Our model is best defined as ‘scenario-based’ with ‘coupled components’ (Kelly et al., 
2013). Specifically, in common with popular complex agricultural simulation models, 
such as AgriPoliS (e.g. Happe et al., 2009) and MP-MAS (Schreinemachers and Berger, 
2011), the simulation comprises distinct ‘modules’ of submodels that each perform a 
specific role.  First, a farm household module enables agents (households) to make 
decisions about agricultural land use and labour allocation, and includes separate crop 
and cattle components. The crop model builds on partial equilibrium models of the 
household (e.g. Angelsen, 1999; Ferraro and Simpson, 2002; Groom and Palmer, 2010, 
2014) and models of land use allocation (Groom et al., 2010); Pascual and Barbier,2007; 
and Shively and Pagiola, 2004) to simulate the optimizing labour and land use decisions 
of heterogeneous farm households given their specific constraints and community wide 
attributes.  Household decision making in the cattle submodel follows more heuristic 
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rules that are consistent with insights gleaned from qualitative fieldwork in the region 
and reflect the special cultural significance of cattle ranching and local preferences for 
using cattle as a savings vehicle.  
Second a state-space controlling ‘shell’ module defines the dynamics of the evolving 
physical and economic landscape in which the community of heterogeneous farm-
households reside, endogenously adjusting wages to local labour market conditions, 
growing the cattle herd at a natural reproduction rate, and determining net migration 
to/from the city. Finally, in a novel contribution that is, to the authors’ knowledge, 
unique to the simulation modelling literature, a third policy maker (or ‘Mayor’) module 
observes real-time information on community well-being, deforestation, 
macroeconomic conditions and the Mayor’s budget (all provided by the shell module), 
and can then adjust a range of policies to try to reduce deforestation and improve 
welfare, subject to not running out of money.  Policy interventions that can be adjusted 
throughout the simulated 20-year period of the model include ones with a development 
focus such as public investments made from the Mayor’s budget. These, in turn, impact 
welfare, productivity, and migration. Local land-use interventions with an 
environmental focus include conservation payments, international payments for 
reducing emissions from deforestation (e.g. REDD), and deforestation taxes that both 
impact land use and the Mayor’s budget, as well as welfare.  
The model, called ‘SimPachamama’ (and freely available for download at: 
http://www.inesad.edu.bo/simpachamama/), is initialised and calibrated using rural 
household survey data from communities in the Beni river region of the Bolivian 
Amazonian frontier and is designed to be useful for students, scholars and stakeholders 
concerned about land-use change and social welfare in tropical forest settings. The 
model’s open source code is based on solid academic foundations and can be easily 
altered or augmented by students and scholars. The attractive, user-friendly interface 
can be easily understood and mastered by non-expert stakeholders, including policy 
makers and villagers/farmers.   
Bolivia provides an appropriate setting for our model. It loses an estimated 300,000 
hectares of forest annually1, mostly due to the expansion of the agricultural frontier 
(Andersen et al., 2012). Furthermore, as in many tropical countries, annual per capita 
income remains below USD 5,000. Outlined in Section 2, the government’s approach has 
been to attempt to tackle both problems simultaneously, developing a programme for 
both reducing deforestation and rural poverty that relies on a broad set of interventions 
(INESAD, 2013).   
Described in detail in Section 3, following the ODD+D protocol (Muller et al., 2013), the 
model is designed to reflect both the realities of the forest frontier and existing 
knowledge of socio-environmental trade-offs in such a setting. In theory, the model 
allows us to explore policy outcomes across an infinite combination of policy choices; in 
practice, the mayor reacts by adjusting policy choices as these outcomes evolve in 
response to previous choices. Over repeated simulations, the relative degree of success 
of different strategies becomes apparent to the mayor, the general results of which are 
shown in Section 4. This allows for experimentation and active policy learning in a 
simulated yet ‘real-world’ setting that can be easily adjusted to other settings. For 
researchers, by recording and comparing these policy sequences and outcomes a 
                                                 
1 Killeen et al. (2007) and FAO (2010). 
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number of potential lessons have emerged that are theoretically coherent and 
potentially empirically testable. We further discuss these lessons and conclude in 
Section 5. 
 
2. The Bolivian setting, methods, and calibration 
2.1 Setting 
Bolivia is relatively early in its forest transition, with more than 50 percent forest cover 
remaining and medium rates of deforestation (FAO, 2010). The country’s 1996 land 
tenure reform law formally recognises indigenous communal properties (Tierra 
Comunitaria de Orígen, TCOs), and a new forestry law promoting sustainable forest 
management recognises some rights of private and communal landowners to forest 
resources. Nevertheless, work remains to finalise reforms and consolidate new property 
rights. 
Bolivia was one of the first countries to develop a national REDD strategy. Between 
2006 and 2010 its government advocated a strong role for forests in international 
climate change negotiations. There were more than 10 different, small-scale REDD 
projects and proposals in Bolivia, including some organised by local NGOs and 
indigenous groups. For example, the ‘Subnational Indigenous REDD Programme in the 
Bolivian Amazon’ was supposed to involve six million hectares in three TCOs, six 
municipal governments and national agencies responsible for forest monitoring.  
However, in April of 2010 the political viability of REDD mechanisms was seriously 
challenged at the politically influential 'World People’s Conference on Climate Change 
and the Rights of Mother Earth:' 
“We condemn market mechanisms such as REDD (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) and its versions + and + +, which are 
violating the sovereignty of peoples and their right to prior free and informed 
consent as well as the sovereignty of national States, the customs of Peoples, 
and the Rights of Nature.” 
Although political causality is unclear, after the Conference the REDD preparation 
process in Bolivia stalled and the political environment grew quite hostile, with the 
Bolivian Government writing to the UNFCCC: “in all actions related to forest, the 
integrity and multifunctionality of the ecological systems shall be preserved and no 
offsetting or market mechanisms shall be applied or developed.”2 (Andersen et al., 
2012). 
The Government has instead started developing an alternative policy for reducing 
deforestation and rural poverty, called the Joint Mitigation and Adaptation Mechanism 
for the Integral and Sustainable Management of Forests (The Mechanism). While still in 
development, the Mechanism relies on a broad set of interventions, including both 
positive and negative incentives, as well as education and the active participation of 
local actors and policy makers (INESAD, 2013). In support of this effort UN-REDD has 
awarded Bolivia USD 1.1 million, and Denmark has also approved at least USD 26 
million. 
                                                 
2
 FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/CRP.23, dated 4 October 2011. 
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At the same time, since 1996 Bolivia has actively pursued improved land tenure policies 
and as a result enjoys relatively strong and secure property rights, with a large 
proportion of plots officially entered in the land registry (INRA, 2007). For example, all 
of the households surveyed in this study (see below) either had clear legal title to their 
land, or were in the process of obtaining title. Thus, while insecure property rights has 
been a major obstacle to successful conservation policy in many developing countries 
(e.g. Streck, 2009; Sunderlin et al., 2009), the relative strength of land tenure in Bolivia 
allows us to assume that such policies can be effective and that these effects are 
observable.  
 
2.2 Design and calibration 
The Bolivian case thus presents a good opportunity to explore the dynamic 
complementarities and trade-offs between policies designed both to reduce 
deforestation and alleviate poverty.  As the model is designed to reflect key institutional 
and cultural features typical of small agricultural communities in the Bolivian lowland 
Amazon frontier, it was designed, initialised, and calibrated based on observed 
behaviour of households in a typical village of Bolivian ‘Colonos’ (indigenous  
Aymara/Quechua migrants from the highlands). Households live on privately-held 
plots, initially assigned by the national government or bought from the local 
municipality, and engage in a combination of subsistence and market agriculture, cattle 
ranching, and some wage labour.  
Broader ethnographic understanding of the area was based on previous research 
conducted by the two anthropologists involved in the project as well as two months of 
dedicated fieldwork in Rurrenabaque and the wider Beni region. This work provided 
significant, in-depth insight into the economic, cultural and environmental context of 
land use decisions of households. In addition the whole team of co-authors conducted a 
workshop in San Buenaventura (April 2012), with the participation of local farmers, 
cattle ranchers, loggers, teachers and the mayor of the municipality.  During the 
workshop we met many local agriculturalists and a number of key model assumptions 
about land tenure, agricultural and cattle decisions, and labour supply and demand 
were discussed.  Stakeholders and decision makers were also asked about their views 
on deforestation, economic development, and potential alternative policy options, such 
as access to finance, education, and migration to urban centres.   
The model thus integrates many key characteristics of the local situation. Land in 
Colonos-type villages of the Beni river region is initially allocated to households by the 
government.  Individual plots are of sufficient size that few families have put all of their 
land into agricultural production, nor have a desire to move to new land.  While 
property rights in the region are reasonably well defined and secure, precluding the 
kinds of speculatory and defensive land use choices observed in some other Amazonian 
communities (e.g. Alston and Mueller, 2010), proof of land tenure is obtained only after 
some time (as resident agriculturalists).  As a result we observe very few (if any) land 
market transactions taking place and there is, as yet, no sustained market for private 
land.  
There is also a local reluctance to sell cattle. As in many Amazonian communities, cattle 
have a cultural and social significance that extends beyond the purely economic returns 
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it provides.  In particular cattle are seen as a source of social status and a primary form 
of household wealth formation and savings, as well as a hedge against future risk 
(Faminow, 1998; Birner, 1999). As a result households accumulate cattle steadily.  In 
the local ideal it is only once a family has more cattle than can be sustained on the 
available land that excess cattle will be sold.  For example, at our participatory 
workshop in 2012 agriculturalists explained that as the extensive form of cattle 
ranching practiced in this area can be practiced with minimal labour requirements, all 
the households accumulated cattle as their herd grew and eventually aspired to be pure 
cattle ranchers if they could.  Thus in SimPachamama households choose cropping 
levels to maximise profits, but follow a more heuristic accumulation rule when it comes 
to cattle. 
Finally, the model reflects a local labour market in which families first depend on their 
own labour for agricultural activities, although they can hire in extra wage labour if they 
need to and have available cash. Individuals may choose to work for others if they are 
not needed on their own land. 
To quantitatively calibrate the initial parameters and features of the model we make 
intensive use of a household-level survey conducted in 2011 of 290 agricultural 
households from three such communities in the Beni river region on the Amazonian 
frontier (Leguia et al., 2011). Data from the Leguia et al. (2011) household survey was 
used for initial calibration of the model, including the distribution across all households 
of: household size, household wealth, household tenure (years on plot), property size, 
initial land use, and the size of the cattle herd. Data from the survey was also used for 
setting initial wage, cattle stocking and reproduction rates. Summary statistics of the 
main variables of interest are presented in Table 1. This table illustrates that the 
dominant non-forest land use is pasture followed by fallow and finally, agriculture.  For 
model calibration and initialization of the simulation we choose observations only from 
‘Colonos’ households. 
TABLE 1 HERE 
The insights and information gleaned from both the ethnographic fieldwork, the 
participatory workshop and the household survey were used to inform our decisions 
about model design and structure, and the overall performance of the model was to 
some degree externally validated by comparing simulated and actual outcomes.  For 
example, Figure 1 shows the land use pattern generated during a typical run of model, 
while Figure 2 portrays a recent satellite photo (from Google Maps) showing the typical 
‘fishbone’ pattern of land use from the Beni river region. 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
The local roots of SimPachamama also differentiate it in specific ways from other 
popular agricultural simulation models.  For example, while a major component of some 
market models such as AgriPoliS (e.g. Happe et al., 2009) and MP-MAS 
(Schreinemachers and Berger, 2011) is an active land market, while, as we explained 
above, SimPachamama does not have a land market.  Bolivian lowlanders do engage in 
both off-farm wage labour and in agricultural wage labour, and while there is some 
degree of both in- and out-migration, the region is still relatively isolated from broader 
labour markets.  Thus, while in both AgripoliS and MP-MAS wages are exogenously 
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given and fixed, in SimPachamama wages adjust each period in reaction to changes in 
local labour supply and demand, which in turn leads households to modify land use 
decisions.  Finally, while both AgriPoliS and MP-MAS treat cattle as just another market 
commodity in a portfolio of potential land uses, our qualitative fieldwork suggested that 
cattle have special cultural significance in the Beni region and households followed 
much more heuristic accumulation rules that are reflected in the design of 
SimPachamama. 
 
3.  The Model 
In this section we systematically describe the model’s variables, agents, structure, and 
specific decision rules following the ODD+D (Overview, Design Concepts, and Details + 
Human Decision Making) protocol outlined in Muller et al. (2013) as a common, 
systematic way to describe simulation models to make them more easily comparable.  
Specifically, first we outline the model’s state-space variables and scales, provide an 
overview of the simulation process and describe the set of decisions taken by each of 
the three modules.  We then outline some general design concepts and describe in detail 
the specific algorithms and decision rules utilized in each submodel.  At the end of the 
section we discuss issues of model validation. 
3.1 State variables and scales  
Agents represent farm households, with the maximum number of initial farms equal to 
100.  The user can define initial population density to be 50, 70, or 100, with lower 
density allowing more space for community expansion. The maximum number of total 
farm households in the simulation is 162. State variables that are fixed (exogenous) and 
common across farm households include the proportion of agricultural land under 
fallow, the cattle reproduction rate, cattle stocking rate, the urban wage in the city, and 
the price of agricultural outputs. State variables that are fixed (exogenous) and 
heterogeneous across farm households include initial plot size, initial land use(forest, 
cleared land, pasture, fallow), initial cattle herd size, household size, household age, and 
initial household wealth.  Land use patterns, cattle herd, household labour supply and 
household wealth evolve endogenously. State variables that change endogenously 
within the model as a result of farm household and Mayor decisions include the rural 
wage, the Mayor’s budget, and the community migration rate.  Community-wide state 
variables that are under the control of the Mayor include the number of non-agricultural 
jobs (‘Green Jobs’), the level of public investment, the level of the deforestation tax, the 
level of conservation payments, and whether or not international REDD payments are 
offered. 
3.2 Process overview and scheduling  
The spatial resolution of the model comprises an area of approximately 330 square 
kilometres, or 33,000 hectares, with a potential maximum of 162 individual plots 
arrayed along a road approximately 20 kilometres long, where the initial distribution of 
plot size reflects the actual observed distribution from the household survey, with all 
new plots being allocated 50 hectares each, in correspondence with the Bolivian 
government’s settlement policies.  This was designed to resemble a typical Bolivian 
village in the Beni River region (see section 2.2).   
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The temporal resolution of the entire simulation spans a period of 20 years, with the full 
series of farm household decisions taking place within each year and the shell module 
taking the outcomes of these decisions and combining them with the annual choices of 
the Mayor to calculate the new state-space (available land, size of the cattle herd, rural 
wage, availability of off-farm jobs) that farm households will face in the next year. 
The order of decision making within each of the three sub-components in the model is 
described below.  As decisions made in one module may affect decisions in the other 
modules, the entire process for a single ‘year’ involves an interwoven sequence that is 
depicted by a schematic graphic in Figure 3.    
FIGURE 3 HERE 
3.2.1 Farm Household Component:  Farm Households make a combination of utility-
maximization3 and heuristic accumulation decisions that determine land use and labour 
market outcomes. 
(1) At the start of each period (year) farm households decide the optimal amount of 
land to cultivate (from land already cultivated) as well as additional land to clear 
(deforest) for agriculture, given that the costs for cultivating deforested land 
must include the costs of deforestation.  A certain proportion of land must be left 
fallow in each period.  If the optimal amount of land for agriculture is less than 
the amount already under cultivation, or if deforestation costs are prohibitively 
high, no deforestation occurs.  However if the optimal amount of agricultural 
land desired by the household is greater than the amount existing cleared land 
then deforestation will occur as long as the additional benefit is greater than the 
additional costs associated with clearing. Given the off-farm wage and the 
household’s value of leisure, households choose the required labour supply for 
cultivation and/or clearing. This includes the possibility to hire in labour at the 
prevailing agricultural market wage.  
 
(2) Households then compare profits from cultivating newly-cleared land to that 
available from conservation payments to decide whether it is instead more 
profitable to set aside land for conservation rather than to deforest. 
(3) Households then decide how much land is required for pasture for cattle.  As 
households follow a heuristic accumulation rule for cattle (see section 3.41), they 
observe the size of their herd, the cattle stocking rate, and the costs of 
‘harvesting’ (selling) cattle, and decide how much land to allocate to pasture for 
cattle. If they have achieved a profit-maximizing optimal herd size then they sell 
any excess cattle.  If they have not yet reached the optimal herd size, the farm 
household compares the benefits of expanding the herd to the costs of 
deforestation for additional cattle pasture (e.g. due to a deforestation tax). The 
maximum herd size is reached either when it is no longer profitable to clear 
more land to expand the herd or if the household has exhausted all the land 
available in its plot. Then any new cattle produced by the herd (reproduction) 
are sold by the household.  
                                                 
3
 The model assumes that farm households always respond rationally, with full information on prices.  Farm 
households are assumed always to comply with any tax or payment contract. In general, regardless of policy 
faced, households are assumed always to choose the option which optimises household utility.  
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(4) After taking into account the possibility of conservation payments and the need 
for pasture for future cattle herd growth, households decide whether or not to 
change the area of forest under conservation in order to maximize utility.  This 
decision affects the amount of available land the farm household has at their 
disposal the following year. 
 
3.2.2 Policy-maker (‘Mayor’) Component:  The policy-maker (Mayor) module is 
operated by the model user, with the objective to effectively balance household well-
being (including community level inequality) and environmental sustainability as 
reflected in the quintile measures of deforestation and well-being and the community 
wide ‘Score’ calculated by the shell module.   
The Mayor observes the quintile well-being and deforestation plots as well as her 
budget.  A choice of additional state variables including the daily wage, the total cattle 
herd and the population growth rate may also be observed, as well as the community 
Score calculated by the shell module.  In turn the Mayor may decide to adjust the level of 
each of five possible policy levers (described further in section 3.4.2): 
1. Public Investment (in education, health & infrastructure) 
2. Investment in local, non-agricultural jobs (‘Green Jobs’) 
3. Deforestation Tax (negative incentive) 
4. Conservation Payments (positive incentive) 
5. International Incentives for reduced emissions from deforestation and 
degradation (REDD, per ton of avoided carbon dioxide emissions from 
deforestation) 
 
3.2.3 Shell Component:  The shell module will register decisions made by farm 
households and any changes made by the policy-maker (Mayor) module during the year 
to calculate outcomes and new state-space for the following year. 
Specifically, as explained in more detail below in section 3.43, the shell module: 
1. Determines the agricultural wage rate for the next year. 
2. Determines net migration that determines population numbers in the next year. 
3. Adds population via natural population growth, which is assumed to increase by 
2% per year. 
4. Increases the size of the cattle herd of each farm-household for the next year 
based on the natural cattle reproduction rate. 
5. Calculates community-wide measures of household well-being and deforestation 
used to calculate a community 'Score' for that year. 
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3.3 Design Concepts 
3.3.1 Objectives 
Farm households make land use and labour supply decisions to maximize utility as a 
function of consumption and leisure, and follow heuristic wealth (cattle) accumulation 
rules subject to resource constraints.  The policy-maker (Mayor) user adjusts policy 
levers; the objective depends on the researcher’s aim.  Normally the objective would be 
to maximize the overall community well-being, as measured by a multidimensional 
utility function that takes into account both the level and the distribution of economic 
wealth, and environmental sustainability as measured by the extent of deforestation. 
However, a user might decide to try to maximize economic welfare (for example to 
gauge the environmental impact), to minimize deforestation, or even to maximize the 
Mayor’s budget (for example to simulate a greedy or corrupt government).  With five 
policy levers and 20 years the number of possible policy scenarios is essentially infinite; 
in section 4 we explore several of these many alternatives. 
3.3.2 Agent-Agent and Agent-Environment interaction 
The households interact indirectly via changing wages as the labour market clears; 
labour demand and supply decisions of one household will affect the rural wage in the 
next year, which in turn will affect other household’s labour and land use decisions.  In 
addition, to the extent that the Mayor reacts to changes in aggregate well-being and land 
use with new policies, households’ state space will be affected by other households’ 
decisions.  
The model assumes that perfect information of policy impacts is received by the Mayor 
on an annual basis. In reality there are costly informational requirements that may not 
be met in poor, rural communities, so this ability to respond instantaneously with policy 
adjustment overlooks the potential for policy inertia and could provide an interesting 
extension in the future. 
3.3.3 Initialisation and Input 
The model is initialised using starting values for each household derived from our 
household survey for family size, family wealth, family tenure (years on plot), farm plot 
size, farm land use (forest, cleared land, pasture, fallow), and cattle herd size.  Values for 
global state variables cattle stocking rate and agricultural wage were adopted directly 
from the household survey as well. 
 
3.4 Submodels 
3.4.1 Farm Household Decision Module 
The farm household model is described more formally in Appendix 1. Farm households 
are heterogeneous in their initial endowment of land, cattle, and family size. Total 
household time (T) is divided between on-farm labour (L), local agricultural wage 
labour (Lw, where w is the wage rate), off-farm non-agricultural labour (LOFF), and 
leisure (l). On-farm labour is in turn divided between labour cultivating previously 
cleared land (Lf) and labour spent clearing (deforesting) and cultivating new land (LD). 
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Off-farm labour may be constrained to some level so that Lw<E, where E is an upper 
bound that may be below the optimal level of Lw. In other words, there may be some 
involuntary unemployment with respect to off-farm labour. We assume all households 
value both consumption and leisure, and that these can be mapped to a welfare function 

U C,l Cl . However household types differ by the internal and external constraints 
that they face.  
All households have an initial allocation of cleared land, Ht-1. This is a proportion of their 
overall land endowment, and they can clear more land if they choose. By supplying 
labour to work their land, or renting labour from the local market, they can produce 
agricultural output, which is translated into consumption at a given rate, p (the price of 
agricultural output). Households can also work for wages on other farms (at wage rate 
w), which also generates income that translates into consumption, or they can enjoy 
leisure, which also brings them well-being. The values of  and  (set to 0.4 and 0.6 
respectively) reflect the substitutability of consumption and leisure. Diminishing 
marginal returns to consumption and leisure are deployed as working assumptions; 
allocate too much time to consumption-generating labour and the relative marginal 
well-being from a time unit of leisure will increase until the household maximising 
reallocates time from labour to leisure.  
Given their total household time budget, the wage at which households can earn in the 
off-farm labour market, w, the limit of off-farm labour they may supply (E), and the 
production function that maps their labour input and land use to output, households 
choose how much land to cultivate, how much new land to clear, how much labour to 
supply to off-farm activities and how much leisure time to enjoy in order to maximise 
their welfare function: 

U C,l . 
On the production side, we specify a parsimonious production function for cultivated 
land that approximates the Bolivian case for smallholders in the area studied. In 
particular, we assume a linear production function in which labour and land are 
required in fixed proportion to produce output. However, diminishing productivity of 
labour and land is captured by a labour requirement that increases with the distance of 
land from the road. This could be interpreted as a travel cost associated with working 
far from the road. In addition to the travel cost of distance, the labour required for 
cultivating cleared land is different from the labour required for clearing (deforesting) 
and cultivating new land. Thus we have a linear, fixed proportion technology that varies 
with distance and discontinuously with type of land under production. Figure 4 
illustrates the marginal cost for labour as a function of land cultivated. 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
We assume that each household’s agricultural crop land is of a fixed width of 200 
metres. This reflects the way in which plots are organised along the roadside in Bolivia 
and also approximates the arrangement of farming more generally. With the width of 
the plot fixed, the area of land, H, is also a metric for distance from the roadside. Figure 
4 shows how the marginal cost of labour varies with the area cultivated. The 
endowment of previously cleared land is given by Ht-1. The marginal cost of labour on 
this land is given by (1+q) and the total cost of cultivating this land is given by the blue 
area. If more land is cultivated then deforestation is required, and the marginal cost of 
labour on this land differs to reflect this: (1+q+s), where q captures travel costs of 
distance and s captures the differential labour required for cultivating new land that 
12 
 
must be cleared first. Figure 4 also shows the case where the maximising level of 
cultivation is given by H*. In this case, deforestation is required at higher marginal cost: 
s > 0. Local interviews around Rurrenabaque and San Buenaventura on the Beni river 
indicated that common practice was to exchange forest clearing services for the wood 
extracted, suggesting that in their case it is likely that s is about zero. Thus, we assume 
s=0, although this parameter can be adjusted for other settings. 
Given this discontinuous cost structure, household optimisation proceeds in two steps. 
First households optimise over their converted land endowment; and second, 
households make a deforestation decision. The first step can be thought of as a 
constrained optimisation problem, with the converted land endowment as the 
constraint. The second step is only considered if the first stage solves as a corner 
solution (e.g. the household chooses to allocate all of its cleared land to agriculture) and 
the shadow price of land is positive (e.g. the marginal return of an additional unit of 
land, if they had it, would be positive). It is therefore necessary, but not sufficient for 
deforestation to take place in the second stage. If the shadow price is sufficiently high to 
overcome the discontinuity in cost driven by s > 0, then deforestation will occur. If s < 0, 
then deforestation is more likely to occur in step 2 if there is a corner solution due to 
lower marginal costs. 
In addition to using land for crops, clearing pasture for cattle is a major driver of 
deforestation in the Amazon Basin (e.g. Andrade de Sa et al., 2013) and is an important 
component of land use around the Beni river area.  Cattle also have the unique property 
that, unlike crops, they reproduce; diminishing returns to land are modelled by 
assuming that livestock follow a standard logistic growth function and the marginal cost 
of harvesting are assumed to be increasing, reflecting some diminishing returns to 
extensive production. This could be motivated by monitoring costs, costs of disease, etc., 
akin to the costs of distance in the agricultural model.  Farm households choose a profit-
maximizing optimal cattle herd size (see Appendix 2) and accumulate cattle each year 
as long as the costs of deforestation for pasture expansion do not exceed the benefits.  
3.4.2 Policy-maker (Mayor) decision module  
The Mayor’s module allows for ‘real time’ policy adjustments to be made by the user. 
The shell module provides the mayor with a host of information about the current state-
space, including the average well-being of the households (explained in detail in section 
3.4.3), the extent of deforestation, the number of cattle, the wage level, and the local 
government's (Mayor’s) budget. Based on this information the Mayor can make 
adjustments to the following policy levers: Public Investment; Investment in local, non-
agricultural jobs (Green Jobs); Deforestation Tax; Conservation Payments; International 
Incentives for reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation. 
Public Investment combines investment in education, health and public infrastructure. 
Such investments tend to increase human well-being but are also costly. The default 
value of Public Investment is set at USD 15,000 per year, which is approximately the 
amount the community receives in transfers from the central government every year. In 
Bolivia, this money comes mainly from the Direct Tax on the extraction of oil and gas 
and amounts to approximately USD 50 per person depending on the price of oil. As the 
local government spends this down or brings in additional funds, this budget may 
increase or decrease. 
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The second type of policy intervention is to provide alternative off-farm employment 
opportunities which cause less deforestation and at the same time higher incomes. This 
not only has favourable direct effects on the people who are employed, but by reducing 
the supply of agricultural labor these initiatives also lead to increases in agricultural 
wages, which in turn tends to both reduce economic inequality as well as raise the costs 
of agriculture and deforestation. We dub these Green Jobs policies as they have a series 
of attractive effects, but they are also extremely expensive. For example, if the local 
government wants to stimulate jobs in the tourism sector, it has to invest in good 
tourism facilities, such as roads, airports, water, sanitation, communication, etc. We 
assume the cost of one Green Job at USD 6,000, about half the estimated country-wide 
average investment needed to create a job in Bolivia (Muriel and Jemio, 2010). 
 
The Deforestation Tax, between 0 and USD 500 per hectare, will directly affect 
the decision to deforest. If very high, farmers will find it more profitable to cultivate 
already cleared land instead of deforesting new areas, and cattle ranchers will choose to 
sell more of their cattle instead of letting the stock increase every year. At the same 
time, the Tax reduces household net incomes and thus their level of well-being. 
Although the Bolivian government has recently implemented such a tax, the revenues 
go directly to the central government. Local communities do not currently perceive any 
benefits from this tax. Instead, it is viewed as a drain on community revenues, reducing 
both incomes and jobs. Even though such a decentralized Tax is hypothetical for the 
case of Bolivia, it is plausible given recent, global trends to decentralize natural resource 
management (see Larson and Soto, 2008). In focusing on taxing deforestation, we 
abstract from taxation elsewhere in our economy, e.g. on consumption, that may also 
influence land use.  
 
The last local policy lever, Conservation Payments, represents a scheme where 
households are offered a financial incentive for any land that they promise to keep 
forested for at least 20 years. The scheme is similar to SocioBosque in Ecuador and 
COMSERBO in Pando, Bolivia, with annual payments varying from 0 to USD 100 per 
hectare. When offered the option of participating in such a scheme, each household will 
calculate how much land it is optimal for them to dedicate to conservation, and how 
much it should make available for its agricultural needs. In addition, while all policies 
can be changed at any time during the 20-year simulation period, we assume that if the 
Payment is changed, households who have already signed a Payment contract are 
liberated and free to re-optimise their decision under the new conditions. 
 
Finally, in addition to the four local policies, we include the possibility of accepting an 
International Incentive for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation 
(REDD), e.g. financed through the voluntary carbon market, at the community level.4 
When this option is active the community will receive a reward for every hectare of 
reduced deforestation, with a default price of USD 5,000 per hectare. This corresponds 
to USD 10 per ton of avoided CO2 emissions from deforestation, and can be adjusted in 
the model.5 The 'Reduction' is calculated as the difference from the ‘business-as-usual’ 
scenario obtained by letting the model run for 20 years with only default Public 
Investment. 
                                                 
4
 Bluffstone et al. (2013) discuss the practicalities of community-controlled forests participating in REDD+. 
5
 Bolivian forests have the potential to release, on average, about 500 tons of CO2 per ha, if burned. 
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3.4.3 Shell Module 
Each year the Shell module evaluates human well-being and deforestation per capita for 
each quintile of well-being in the population (itself a function of wealth, leisure, 
ecosystem services and public infrastructure). The community receives five scores (as 
illustrated in Figure 5) corresponding to the average well-being and deforestation per 
capita of each quintile. These five quintile scores sum to the community 'Score' for a 
given year. 
Calculating deforestation per capita is straightforward. To calculate the human well-
being of each household the shell module evaluates a five-argument Cobb-Douglas 
multidimensional well-being function in the spirit of Schreinemachers and Berger 
(2011): 
(1) 𝑊(𝑐, 𝑙, 𝑥, 𝐸𝑆, 𝑃𝐼) = 𝑐𝛼𝑙𝛽𝑠𝛾𝐸𝑆𝛿𝑃𝐼𝜀 
Where:  
c = private consumption per capita (average consumption within the family, 
measured in tons of rice equivalents). 
l = private leisure per capita (average leisure within the family, measured as a 
fraction of total time available in a year) 
x = private cattle stock per capita (average number of cattle per person 
within the family) 
ES = ecosystem services (total forest area in community measured in square 
kilometers) 
PI = public infrastructure (stock of public infrastructure measured in millions 
of USD). 
Well-being is measured in Happy Life Years (HLY) scaled between 20 and 80 (NEF 
2009).  The parameters , , ,  and  are set to reflect how much time households 
would typically dedicate to/benefit from each component in an average 24-hour-day. 
For example, people generally often demand least 10 hours of leisure per day, so  has 
been set to 0.4. They would dedicate about a third of the day to production for 
consumption so  has been set to 0.3. Since cattle constitute their main savings vehicle, 
and people would like to save about 5% of their potential income (corresponding to 
about 10% of realized income), we have set  to 0.05. Ecosystem services from the 
forest surrounding the community provide services that we assess to be roughly equal 
to a couple of hours of work per day, so  is set to 0.1. The same kind of logic holds for 
public infrastructure, like roads, schools, health clinics, etc., and we have set  to 0.15. 
For each quintile, average well-being (calculated from all households in the quintile 
using equation (1)), and average deforestation per capita are plotted by the Shell 
module in 'well-being – deforestation' space, which in turn is divided into four ringed 
zones. Each zone corresponds to a score indicating how well the two objectives have 
been achieved. The approach is illustrated below in Figure 5, with each of the four rings 
earning a score of 25, 10, 5 and 0, respectively. The community Score is then the sum of 
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the individual quintile scores (in the example in Figure 5, for example, the score would 
be 20) . A high Score would therefore represent a situation in which most if not all 
quintiles are to be found in the top-left zones; lower Scores, on the other hand, are 
suggestive of trade-offs at least for one or more quintiles and indeed possible 
inequalities emerging in the community. 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
In addition to calculating and evaluating economic, social and environmental progress, 
the shell module updates several features of the state space in which the households 
will make their decisions in the following year.  First, the shell module determines the 
agricultural wage rate for the next year.  Labour market clearing occurs by taking into 
account all available jobs (including labour required for agriculture as decided by the 
farm households), if there remains unemployment then wages remain at the minimum 
level.  If there are more jobs than there are workers, then the wage increments upwards 
towards the maximum wage. The increment is the larger the larger is the labour 
demand gap.  The new wage will be the agricultural market wage in the next period. 
Secondly, to determine the percentage of in-migration the module compares the current 
and previous year’s community Score and increases the local population by 0.1% for 
each one point increase in the community well-being score, up to a maximum of 5%., as 
long as land is available and community well-being is above 25 HLY. The families that 
arrive are very poor (four persons in each family, zero savings) and are allocated a 50 
hectare plot on the next empty spot along the road, along with one cow. They then start 
farming according to the farm household model. 
To determine out-migration the module increases by 0.1 percentage points of the 
population for every USD 2,000 in Public Investment (which increases education) up to 
the maximum of 5% per year, while for every non-agricultural job created, out-
migration is reduced by one randomly chosen person. 
Third, the shell module also adds population via natural population growth, which is 
assumed to increase by 2% per year, with households adding the requisite number of 
new members every 20 years to achieve this. As households begin the simulation with 
varying lengths of residency, this population growth in practice is achieved with some 
subset of households increasing in size each period. In addition, following the standard 
of the Bolivian settlement policy in this area (INRA, 2007), each additional new person 
is allocated 50 hectares of forested land, which is appended to the household plot. 
Finally, the shell module increases the size of the cattle herd of each farm-household for 
the next year based on the natural cattle reproduction rate which is assumed to follow a 
standard logistic function as:  
(2)   2xxxG    
where x denotes the stock of cattle per hectare, and growth parameters 0  and 0  
where  is the "intrinsic growth rate," which we set to 0.25, and  /  is the carrying 
capacity of a hectare of land, which based on field observations and the household 
survey we set equal to 1. 
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3.5 Model Validation  
The optimising behaviour of our farm households was validated first, by construct, on 
the basis of well-established theories of the household in development and agricultural 
economics, e.g. Angelsen (1999). Since our initial parameter values are set to 
quantitative household data collected in the field we have a perfect initial goodness-of-
fit.  Further model validation by results was achieved by studying the model in the 
baseline scenario (see Section 4). Although the results seem sensible, we cannot 
undertake further analysis due to the fact that the household data are only available as a 
cross-section; in order to test whether or not the simulated results over time are 
consistent with observed household behaviour we would need panel data, which are 
currently unavailable.  
The workshops and ethnographic research described in Section 2 helped in validating 
local land use behaviour and the policy setting. Our assumption of myopic households is 
based on the observation that households, particularly poorer ones, often had relatively 
short time horizons, and where there was potentially forward-looking behaviour, 
notably households’ preference to save via the accumulation of cattle, households 
tended to follow heuristic rules that varied little from year to year.  To the extent that 
our assumption of myopia is an oversimplification, however, we note that it was a 
necessary one, as optimising both agricultural and cattle decisions dynamically over the 
runtime of the model, combined with the real-time policy adjustments made by the 
Mayor, would have been too computationally demanding. 
 
4. Results   
 
Our approach allows for quasi-general equilibrium, quasi-dynamic modelling that is 
based largely on micro-fundamentals, while also permitting us to explore the 
implications of highly heterogeneous households and general equilibrium feedback 
effects. The shell module plays the role of producing the latter effects that would not 
have been apparent from a simple partial equilibrium analysis of the household, but in a 
more feasible manner and at much lower computational cost than a true dynamic 
general equilibrium optimisation model.  
An important difference between our hybrid model and more conventional policy 
analysis tools is that the mayor receives feedback on a range of economic and 
environmental state-space characteristics from the shell module in real time over the 
run of the simulation. In response to this feedback, she can adjust any of the policy 
levers to try to influence community outcomes. As such, our approach more closely 
approximates real world policy making, although unlike the real world our mayor can 
experiment by making multiple attempts to influence outcomes. The potential to 
explore outcomes produced by different combinations and dynamic sequences of 
policies means that, in theory, there are an almost infinite number of possible 
combinations and alternative sequences of policies that could be tried. While this 
precludes the use of Monte-Carlo simulations on random combinations of dynamic 
policy choices, here we present a number of general results for the policy choices of a 
mayor whose chief aim is either maximising revenue (‘greedy mayor’); maximising well-
being (e.g. via Public Investment); reducing deforestation (Conservation Payments); or 
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jointly maximising well-being and reductions in deforestation (via a combination of 
policies).  
We begin by simulating the business-as-usual (baseline) scenario in which the only 
policy is the default USD 15,000 of Public Investment, funded by lump sum transfer to 
the mayor from the central government.  Since this is the only money entering or 
leaving the community, it represents a very localised and self-contained economy (the 
mayor cannot borrow in order to finance policy).  The first column of Table 2 (where 
Deforestation Tax is set to zero) reports the baseline outcomes of deforestation, number 
of cattle, wage rate, well-being, and the community Score. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
An important thing to note is that once policies (beyond the baseline USD 15,000 of 
Public Investment) are implemented, the mayor tends to run out of money very quickly, 
thus ending the simulation.  Consistent with the fiscal reality of most local governments, 
the Mayor in SimPachamama must raise revenue to fund additional policies, and in the 
model this may come from two possible sources: a Deforestation Tax and an 
International Incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation. 
While both of these policy levers are expected to affect both well-being and 
deforestation, they are primarily implemented by the Mayor as a means of reducing 
deforestation.  The results of simulating a local Deforestation Tax can be seen in Table 2.  
As the Deforestation Tax rises with each increment of USD 50 per hectare, the amount 
of deforestation steadily declines, as does the number of cattle, while well-being 
remains initially stable. The fact that aggregate community well-being doesn’t fall at 
lower levels of Tax reflects the fact that it is mainly paid by a small number of wealthier 
(larger) cattle ranchers, who need much more cleared land than subsistence farmers.  
When the revenue generated supports further Public Investment (not shown) it 
therefore acts as a kind of ‘Robin Hood’ tax, with the revenues redistributed from the 
wealthiest to the poor through public spending, hence reducing inequality.   
Shown in Table 2, the community Score increases due to reductions in deforestation, 
and the Mayor is able to stay within her budget constraint for the entire 20-year period. 
Between USD 300 and USD 400 per hectare, however, there is a sudden sharp drop both 
in deforestation and well-being. From this relatively high Tax level onwards it is not 
possible to reduce deforestation any further. A high Tax also drives people out of the 
community thus resulting in negative annual population growth in some years. The fall 
in well-being can be explained by the fact that the Mayor is not investing any of the 
revenues from the Tax in the community (a ‘greedy mayor’ scenario). In turn, this drop 
in well-being dominates the fall in deforestation, thus explaining the decline in the 
Score. In the model, the Tax can, however, be used to finance other policies, which could 
help build and maintain local support for policy goals as well as allowing greater 
flexibility in local policy-making.  
In Table 3, we set the Tax at the median level of USD 250 per hectare and explore 
outcomes from policies aimed at increasing well-being (Public Investment and Green 
Jobs) that occur, yet without the benefit of International Incentives for reducing 
emissions from deforestation and degradation. Note that all policies are implemented 
independently from the first year of the simulation and are on top of the annual transfer 
from the central government of USD 15,000 for Public Investment. 
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TABLE 3 HERE 
The results in Table 3 show that well-being increases with increased Public Investment, 
which drives higher community Scores. Deforestation and cattle numbers also appear to 
rise slightly with Public Investment despite the Deforestation Tax. This occurs because 
of increased in-migration due to the higher level of community well-being.  Table 3 also 
illustrates that at the level of Tax chosen (USD 250 per hectare), the Mayor is limited in 
the amount by which she can increase Public Investment; USD 50,000 or more is 
infeasible.  Nor can she afford to invest in any Green Jobs. Expensive investments, such 
as the creation of Green Jobs, can be introduced only as the Mayors’ revenues increase.  
For example, a Green Job policy becomes more of an option if the Mayor elects to 
receive revenues from International Incentives for reduced deforestation (see below).  
If funds are only available from the Deforestation Tax, a possible alternative strategy 
(not shown) is for the mayor to implement a maximum tax on deforestation and save 
for some years, in order to create a few Green Jobs during the latter years of the 
simulation run.  
Table 4 repeats the exercise presented in Table 3, but now also allows for International 
Incentives for reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation.  International 
Incentives are provided at the community, not individual, level after land clearing 
decisions have been made.  We set a price of USD 10/tCO2, corresponding to USD 
5,000/ha of avoided deforestation. As a comparison of the results in Tables 3 and 4 
makes clear, International Incentives provide a powerful opportunity for local 
governments to collectively lower deforestation. The complementary combination of 
International Incentives and a Deforestation Tax greatly increases the Mayor’s budget 
and allows for much greater expansion of social policy than either International 
Incentives or Deforestation Taxes alone. For example, additional Public Investment is 
possible and even a few Green Jobs can be introduced. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
We now consider a scenario in which the Mayor is focused on reducing deforestation, 
accepting International Incentives and implementing a Conservation Payment financed 
by a Deforestation Tax.  We assume that any excess revenue not spent on Conservation 
Payments are invested first in Public Investment and finally, if funds remain, on Green 
Jobs (e.g. we assume a benevolent, rather than greedy, mayor).  This policy combination 
demonstrates that the effects of the different policies are not only non-linear, but that 
they also interact in complex ways. Figure 6 shows that increasing the size of the 
Conservation Payment will contribute to further reductions in deforestation, but only if 
the Tax is low. The result illustrates that very high levels of Deforestation Tax dominate 
household decision making and result in reduced deforestation regardless of the level of 
Conservation Payment. In these cases, Conservation Payments have no additional 
impact and simply act as a fiscal transfer to households. But at lower Deforestation Tax 
rates, as expected, the Tax is much less effective in reducing deforestation and hence, 
even relatively low Payments can have an impact on reducing deforestation against the 
baseline.  
FIGURE 6 HERE 
Conservation Payments also have an indirect effect on inequality in the simulation. In 
general, farmers and ranchers in the model calculate how much land they are going to 
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need for the next 20 years and the land they volunteer in exchange for Conservation 
Payments tends to be that which is the least profitable to cultivate, i.e. to be found 
farthest away from the road. This therefore implies that the poorest households tend to 
benefit disproportionately from this scheme, as they will often not have the financial 
resources to cultivate their entire plot anyway.  
As discussed, the Deforestation Tax cannot be too low because otherwise there is 
insufficient money in the Mayor’s budget to finance policies, including the Conservation 
Payments. For example, if the Tax is USD 100/ha, then the Payment cannot increase to 
more than USD 30/ha/year without the mayor running out of money. In contrast, with 
higher Taxes (above USD 350/ha), adding a Payment does little to further reduce 
deforestation.6 In line with the results in Table 3, this is because marginal land has 
already been removed from production due to the Tax and quite a high payment would 
be required to further reduce deforestation. 
Conservation Payments could potentially increase human well-being, as participants are 
in effect receiving windfall income. The simulations do not confirm this, however. 
Indeed, Figure 7 shows that for each given level of Tax, the Score decreases with higher 
Payments. This decline is due to reductions in human well-being, and is particularly 
steep for lower Tax rates because the Mayor’s budget is smaller than at higher rates. 
Thus, for each dollar spent on Payments is one less dollar allocated to Public Investment 
or Green Jobs. At higher rates of Tax, this is less of an issue. But given the model 
parameters, it is only optimal to make Payments if there is money left over, i.e. after 
allocating Tax revenues to Public Investment and Green Jobs.  
FIGURE 7 HERE 
In sum, if the Mayor does not implement a Deforestation Tax early on, she will run out 
of money very soon after implementing one or more of the other policies. Yet even at 
high Tax levels, it is challenging to stay within budget while simultaneously increasing 
well-being and reducing deforestation. Introducing the International Incentive for 
reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation helps the mayor overcome this 
apparent trade-off between well-being and deforestation even at relatively modest 
carbon prices. Indeed, if the mayor is successful at halting deforestation, she receives 
revenues sufficient to spend on policies to improve well-being. 
Our results suggest that policies have to be continuously adjusted and fine-tuned in 
order to obtain the desired outcomes, and that correct sequencing is critical. Revenue 
must be generated to fund policies that both raise well-being and in turn generate more 
revenue. This in turn stresses the need for policies that are not only effective in reaching 
their aims but also efficient in their use of public funds. Although an obvious point, it 
continues to be neglected in discussions about policy design and implementation in 
tropical forests. Reduced deforestation, whether induced by Deforestation Taxes, 
Conservation Payments or International Incentives, provides some positive effects for 
well-being but by itself does little to improve well-being sufficiently to compensate for 
lost agricultural output. Thus, spending on Public Investment and Green Jobs is essential 
to achieve improvements in both environment and development.  
 
                                                 
6
 The optimal tax is not necessarily the highest tax; a tax of $350/hectare was found to be the optimal tax, both 
with and without international compensation for reduced deforestation. 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Policy interventions designed to simultaneously stem deforestation and reduce poverty 
in tropical countries entail complex socio-environmental trade-offs. In order to explore 
these trade-offs we develop a model of land use change and human well-being using a 
parsimonious representation of agricultural and economic decisions that emerges from 
both quantitative and qualitative research on the local socio-economic context and 
culture of the Beni river region in lowland Bolivia. While our hybrid, optimising-
heterogeneous agent model (‘SimPachamama’) is calibrated to the initial conditions of 
these smallholders, the optimisation problems solved by the agents across a number of 
dimensions are broadly generalisable. In particular, heterogeneous households 
endogenously choose how much land to cultivate, how large a cattle herd to maintain, 
and whether to expand at the extensive margin by deforesting. The optimisation 
problem of households takes into account wage differentials and the availability of local 
non-agricultural jobs to determine how much labour to rent out or rent in agricultural 
labour markets, and how much labour to supply outside of farming activities.  
The Mayor (model user) makes policy choices in ‘real time’ subject to her budget 
running out of money, which in turn impacts households' opportunities; the net effect of 
these decisions is transmitted to the next period through stock, wage and price 
adjustments via the shell module. Continuous policy adjustments by the Mayor alter the 
trajectory across both socio-economic and environmental outcomes.  Thus an important 
difference between SimPachamama and other commonly used socio-agricultural 
simulations is that our approach allows the user to experiment with alternative policy 
bundles and sequences, observing the consequences of policy changes in ‘real time.’  
While the instantaneous, perfect information of the Mayor may be unrealistic for 
modelling policy inertia and other real world phenomena, it does allow users in this role 
over repeated simulation runs to gain an understanding of the potential trade-offs and 
complementarities of policies aimed at improving economic outcomes and reducing 
environmental harm.  Furthermore, the graphically sophisticated game-like interface of 
SimPachamama makes the simulation accessible to a wide range of users, including not 
only researchers and students but also policy makers and local stakeholders, making 
the model a useful tool for encouraging local participatory engagement and student 
learning. 
In addition to its pedagogical features, the potential to explore multiple outcomes 
produced by different combinations and dynamic sequences of policies also makes 
SimPachamama a powerful resource for researchers, with an almost infinite number of 
possible combinations and alternative sequences of policies that could be explored.  
Furthermore, the open-source nature of the code allows more advanced users to change 
other features currently fixed in the simulation (for example, it would be possible to 
explore the implications of a change in the government policy of allocating 50 hectares 
to new households, or of a change in agricultural technology).    
In this paper, we report a number of interesting and consistent predictions and 
implications related to policy bundling and sequencing that have emerged from much 
experimentation in choosing and adjusting policy levers throughout multiple runs of the 
20-year simulation.  A key finding is that in the absence of outside finance there are 
significant and virtually unavoidable trade-offs between human well-being and reduced 
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deforestation. Deforestation Taxes can reduce land clearing and raise critical revenue 
for local public policies but only if the revenue from the Tax remains in local hands and 
is used appropriately; otherwise, Taxes on deforestation have the potential to reduce 
well-being.  
Our results reinforce the idea that sequencing of policies is critical for long-run 
successful outcomes, and policies can have unexpected nonlinear effects both 
independently and in combination. Policy complementarities emerge, such as that 
between Conservation Payments and Deforestation Taxes, since these policies have 
different effects on the Mayor's budget and thus indirectly on household decisions and 
well-being. International REDD incentives can help relax constraints on public funding, 
reducing the local tax burden and bringing reductions in deforestation forward to the 
extent that a surplus need not be generated in the first few years.  
In conclusion, our model has proven to be a useful tool for encouraging local 
participatory engagement and exploring a wide range of policy choices and trade-offs. 
We have made SimPachamama publicly available and open-source, so parameters can 
be adjusted or re-calibrated to other settings. In addition the hybrid modular structure 
allows for the potential to add new elements into the model at relatively low cost; for 
example, in its current form we have not yet introduced any explicitly spatial 
interactions, but through the shell module this is a straightforward extension of the 
model.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: The Household Model 
 
For a separable household the problem is simple profit maximisation. With output price, 
p, normalised to 1, and labour receiving the market wage w, the problem can be 
described as follows. Households at time t have some already converted land from the 
previous period: 01 tH . Cultivation in excess of this requires deforestation to take 
place. Labour and land are assumed to be the only inputs to production. Labour used on 
previously cultivated land is given by: 
 
fhfof LLL   
 
Labour used on deforested land is given by: 
 
DhDoD LLL   
 
Labour is applied to converted and unconverted land in a fixed relationship depending 
on distance from the road. Labour can be provided from the households own family 
 foL  or hired  .fhL  Note that if foL  is greater than the constraint 1tH  allows, then it is 
possible that 0fhL  , and hired labour is then only used for deforestation. Production, 
X, is linear in already converted land used, H , and deforested land, D, and a technology 
parameter A: 
 
ADAHX   
 
Profit is therefore written as follows: 
 
   Df LLwADAHp  , 
 
Labour and land have a fixed relationship such that the amount of labour required for 
each additional hectare is given by:  
 
 Hq
H
Lf



1  
 
Given this, an expression for H as a function of labour can be obtained via integration. 
With the width of the plot fixed, H is a measure of distance and so the parameter q can 
be interpreted as a distance cost of labour (see also Angelson, 1999). As discussed in the 
main text, this distance cost changes when deforestation is privately optimal and 
becomes q + s. Profit maximisation proceeds in two steps: 
 
Step 1: solve for H  
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subject to the constraint that labour used on converted land is limited by the amount of 
land converted in the previous period ( 1tH ): 
 
2
1
1
2
1 







q
L
H
f
t  
 
With the functional forms given the first order conditions obtain :
fL  
 
Lf * =
1+q( )w
Ap
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷
-2
1+q( )
2
 
 
The split of fL  between foL  and fhL  is determined by the well-being maximisation 
problem and the choice of ‘leisure'. The first order conditions of this problem obtain 
that the MRS of labour and consumption (the shadow price of labour) should equal the 
wage rate (given that the price of output =1) that is wUUl cl 
 /: . If the solution in 
step 1 is interior then the household stops there. If the land constraint is binding the 
household moves to step 2. Otherwise it is easy to show that with preferences given by 
  lclcu ,  the solutions for l  and c  become: 
 
 
  
 w
wT
l
wq
pA





 12
2
, 
 
  
  p
wT
c
wq
pA





 12
2
, 
 
Where  
 wq
pA


12
*
2
 is the profit function. 
 
Step 2: 
 
If     :02
1
1
2
1



w
q
L
q
A f  move to step 2 and consider deforestation. This means that 
f
t
ff LLL 1
0
  , i.e. the labour associated with the constraint on 1tH . If not then the 
solutions become: 
 
  
 
  
  p
wTwp
c
w
wTwp
l













 ,      ,
,
 
 ,,wp  is once again the profit function. Given the leisure decision, we can now 
define the labour allocations using the constraints. 
 
Households are endowed with overall time T  . Time is divided between on farm work ,
foL , 'leisure', l , and off-farm labour mL . The constraint can be written: T = Lfo +Lm + l.L
fo
 
max
Lf
P
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can be calculated as the residual: 
 
mfo LlTL   
and: 
 
Lf* =T - l -Lm +Lfh*  
or more intuitively: 
 
  fhmf LLlLT  
 
where the right hand side is the net off-farm labour supply (the difference between 
what is rented in and what is rented out). 
 
Step 2: The Deforestation Decision 
If it turns out that there is no internal solution m > 0( ) , the deforestation decision is 
evaluated as in previous models. Where Lt-1
f
 is the labour requirement for production 
on the previously cultivated land 1tH , and since     12
1 11 
  tD
L HqDsq
D
the 
first order conditions for an interior solution are: 
 
 
0: 


DL
D  
Which leads to D* :   
 
D* =
Ap
w - 1+q( )H t-1
1+q+ s( )
 
 
These are the analytical solutions. This defines the total amount of labour applied to 
land, L  as follows: 
 
L* = Lf * + LD*
= Lt-1
f + LD*
= Lo + Lh
 
The last line shows that labour is split between own and hired labour. It is possible to 
identify each of these allocations once the well-being maximisation problem has solved 
for the leisure decision. 
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Appendix 2: The Cattle Model   
 
Specifically, assume the instantaneous stock of cattle is given by  tX , the ‘harvest' (the 
amount of cattle sold) is given by  tR , which can be sold at price 
Cp .   Variable costs of 
selling off cattle are given by   ,, cRXXRc   and are determined by the size of the herd 
X as well as the number of cattle that are sold, R. The cost parameter is c. 
 
Step 1: The intensive decision 
In the first step the technological decision is conditioned on the biological/agronomic 
constraints of land and cattle. We assume that households are separable profit 
maximisers who understand the intertemporal nature of the stocking decision and 
undertake a dynamic optimisation.  
 
The intensive decision is a per-hectare decision. Diminishing returns to land are 
modelled by assuming that livestock follow a standard logistic growth function of the 
form: 
 
  2xxxG   , 
 
Where x is cattle per hectacre, with growth parameters 0  and 0  where  is the 
"intrinsic growth rate" and  /  is the carrying capacity of a hectare of land. This 
represents the production function of livestock. Different technologies would be 
reflected by different values for these growth parameters, leading to different 
reproductive growth and carrying capacities. 
 
The dynamic profit maximisation (where r is harvest per hectacre) problem for the 
household/farm is therefore: 
 
       dtttXtcrtrp
T
c
r
 expmax 0 , 
 
subject to constraint on the initial stock and the livestock growth dynamics: 
 
 
  rxGx
xx



00
 
 
The current value Hamiltonian of this dynamic problem: 
 
   rxxcrxrpxr c  2;   
Appendix 3b below shows that the steady state solution to this problem for R  and x  is 
given by the positive root of the quadratic 02  dbxax : 
 
b
bdaa
x
2
42 
  
And: 
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Where 𝛼 = (𝑝𝑐2𝜇 + 𝑐𝑟 − 2𝜎), 3b  and  rpd c   , are collections of the 
parameters.  
 
Step 2: The extensive decision 
The intensive decision determines the cattle per hectare, and the harvest rate. What 
remains is the extensive decision, that is, how much land  H  is used in the cattle 
operation. Step 2 of the model proceeds as follows. 
 
For simplicity we assume linear relationships between land  H , other variable costs 
(𝐶𝑣) and livestock total harvest  R  of the form: XH  , 𝐶𝑣 = 𝛾𝑋, and 𝑅 = 𝜙𝐶𝑣, 
where 𝐶𝑣  are variable input requirements. This assumption means that the problem 
effectively involves one decision variable. The values of  ,  and   can be determined by 
the solution to step 1: the intensive problem. E.g. the intensity of cattle (cattle per 
hectare) x* = q -1 which was determined in step 1. 
 
Profit is derived from the revenue from harvest pCR( )  minus the costs of variable inputs: 
land H( ), other variable costs (𝐶𝑣)7, and fixed costs, FC . The marginal cost of harvesting 
are assumed to be increasing, reflecting some diminishing returns to extensive 
production. This could be motivated by monitoring costs, costs of disease, etc., akin to 
the costs of distance in the agricultural model. We assume a cost curve for harvesting of 
the form c R( ) = cRk  where ,1k  and c  is a constant, ensuring that ¢c .( ) > 0, ¢¢c .( ) > 0  . 
Given the linear relationships above, the instantaneous profit maximisation problem 
can be written as:8 
 
max 𝜋
𝐻
= 𝑝𝑐
𝜙𝛾
𝜃
𝐻 − 𝑐 (
𝜙𝛾
𝜃
𝐻)
𝑘
+ 𝑝𝐻(?̅? − 𝐻) − 𝑝𝑣
𝛾
𝜃
𝐻 − 𝐹𝑐  
 
 
where the price 
Hp  reflects the opportunity cost of land. The general solution to this 
problem is: 
 
𝐻∗ =
𝜃
𝜙𝛾
(
𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑣𝜙 − 𝑝𝐻
𝜙𝛾
𝜃
𝑘𝑐
)
1
𝑘−1
 
 
𝑅∗ =
𝜙𝛾
𝜃
𝐻∗ 
 
 
                                                 
7
 These could include costs such as feed. 
8
 Note: HR 
 , so as cattle per hectare increases  1  , so does the harvest. 
2  xxr 
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This shows that H *  is inversely related to: i) the cattle per hectare  1  ; ii) the 
marginal cost parameters, c  and k ; iii) the harvest per unit of variable inputs   ; iv) 
other variable costs per head of cattle; and lastly, v) H *  is negatively related to pH , and 
this relationship is stronger if the cattle intensity is higher.  The costs of variable inputs 
(𝑝𝑣) and the price of land pH( )  affect land in slightly different ways. The effects on land 
translate linearly into aggregate harvest R( )  , input requirements (Iv) and the total 
stock of cattle X( ).The resource constraints associated with the dynamic 
intensity/harvest decision, when land is constrained, are embodied in the parameters 
q , g , and   . 
Solution to the Livestock Problem Step 1 
The first order necessary conditions for an optimum are: 
 XcRr
X
H
cXpR c


2:
0:








 
 
The general solution becomes: 
 
 
 
cXp
cR
Xr
cR
Xr
c 







2
2

 
In the steady state where  and  , the steady state stock and harvest rate are 
determined by the following equations. In this is a quadratic equation of the following 
form: 
 
aX +bX2 +d = 0  
where: 
 
 
 rpd
b
crpa
c
c






3
22
 
 The solution is then: 
X* =
a± a2 - 4bd
2b
 
The steady state solution for R* is then simply: 
 
2  XXR   
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Solution to Livestock Problem Step 2 
 
The maximisation problem is: 
 
max 𝜋
𝐻
= 𝑝𝑐
𝜑𝛾
𝜃
𝐻 − 𝑐 (
𝜑𝛾
𝜃
𝐻)
𝑘
+ 𝑝𝐻(?̅? − 𝐻) − 𝑝𝑣
𝛾
𝜃
𝐻 − 𝐹𝑐  
 
 
The Solution is: 
 
𝐻∗ = 𝑝𝑐
𝜑𝛾
𝜃
−
𝜑𝛾
𝜃
𝑘𝑐 (
𝜑𝛾
𝜃
𝐻)
𝑘−1
−
𝑝𝑣𝛾
𝜃
= 0 
 
From which it is straightforward to derive the remaining solutions. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: 2D and 3D screen shot from the model, called ‘SimPachamama’ 
 
 
Note: 
Download SimPachamama at: http://www.inesad.edu.bo/simpachamama/download/ 
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Figure 2:  Google Maps satellite view of typical land use pattern  
near San Buenaventura, Bolivia 
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Figure 3: Graphic schematic depicting the one period (‘year’)  
sequence of interwoven modular decisions 
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Figure 4. The marginal cost of labour as a function of distance from the road 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Calculation of community ‘Scores’ in well-being and deforestation space 
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Figure 6: Reductions in deforestation can be achieved for different combinations 
of deforestation taxes and conservation payments 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Score achieved for different combinations of deforestation tax and 
conservation payment 
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Table 1: Summary statistics from the 2010-2011 Bolivian household survey 
 Rurrenabaque - Reyes Rurrenabaque-Yucumo San Buenaventura - Ixiamas 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. 
Property Size (ha) 45 302.14 986.34 149 53.16 102.65 96 88.76 175.92 
Forest (ha) 45 185.77 639.48 149 25.94 62.24 96 47.27 102.60 
Agriculture (ha) 45 2.00 2.61 149 2.94 3.02 96 3.48 3.36 
Pasture (ha) 45 86.95 416.24 149 17.31 46.57 96 25.20 104.51 
Fallow (ha) 45 27.43 79.87 149 6.98 9.90 96 12.81 23.67 
Distance to Community (km) 45 2.63 3.92 149 1.68 2.49 96 3.64 4.69 
Family Size 45 5.67 2.89 149 5.65 2.53 96 5.59 2.10 
Share of land deforested 45 0.64 0.37 149 0.60 0.28 96 0.42 0.27 
Sells Produce (1=Yes, 0=No) 45 1.00 0.00 149 1.00 0.00 96 0.96 0.20 
Share Income from Agriculture 45 0.50 0.45 149 0.52 0.45 96 0.44 0.42 
Hires Labour (1=Yes, 0=No) 45 0.53 0.50 149 0.62 0.49 96 0.76 0.43 
Years in community 45 16.64 17.39 149 15.87 9.52 96 21.52 14.57 
Net Income (Bs) 45 305.82 481.60 149 309.63 568.00 96 285.62 342.79 
Annual Deforestation (ha) 45 3.14 5.31 149 1.92 1.63 96 2.64 2.39 
Communal land title (1=Yes, 0=No) 45 0.49 0.51 149 0.26 0.44 96 0.53 0.50 
Private land title (1=Yes, 0=No) 45 0.40 0.50 149 0.36 0.48 96 0.43 0.50 
Land titling in process (1=Yes, 0=No) 45 0.11 0.32 149 0.38 0.49 96 0.04 0.20 
Source: Leguia et al. (2011). 
 
 
 
Table 2: Base-line simulation and effects of the Deforestation Tax (without REDD 
payments) 
Outcome Deforestation Tax (USD/ha) 
 0 
(Base-
line) 
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 
Total accumulated 
deforestation (ha) 
5,905 5,790 5,683 5,463 5,332 5,143 4,790 3,457 2,817 2,817 2,817 
Average annual 
reduction in 
deforestation (ha) 
0 6 11 22 29 38 56 122 154 154 154 
Total cattle (#) 7,794 7,598 7,402 7,019 6,831 6,506 5,878 3,383 2,298 2,298 2,298 
Daily wage (USD) 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 
Average well-
being (HLY) 
73 73 73 73 73 73 73 72 58 58 58 
Score (0-100) 45 45 46 46 47 47 50 53 45 45 45 
Note: ‘HLY’ denotes ‘Happy Life Years.’ 
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Table 3: Implementation of a USD 250 per hectare Deforestation Tax plus 
additional Public Investment or Green Jobs (without REDD payments) 
Outcome No other 
policy 
Public Investment 
(USD ‘000 per year) 
Green Jobs 
(# per year) 
10 25 50 85 5 10 15 
Total accumulated 
deforestation (ha) 
5,143 5,277 5,374 - - - - - 
Average annual reduction in 
deforestation (ha) 
38 31 27 - - - - - 
Total cattle (#) 6,506 6,591 6,637 - - - - - 
Daily wage (USD) 7.1 7.1 7.1 - - - - - 
Average well-being (HLY) 73 78 82 - - - - - 
Score (0-100) 47 55 65 - - - - - 
Note: ‘HLY’ denotes ‘Happy Life Years’; - denotes ‘not feasible.’ 
 
 
Table 4: Implementation of a USD 250 per hectare Deforestation Tax plus 
additional Public Investment or Green Jobs (with REDD payments) 
Outcome No other 
policy 
Public Investment 
(USD ‘000 per year) 
Green Jobs 
(# per year) 
10 25 50 85 5 10 15 
Total accumulated 
deforestation (ha) 
5,143 5,277 5,374 5,505 - 5,131 5,100 - 
Average annual reduction in 
deforestation (ha) 
38 31 27 20 - 39 40 - 
Total cattle (#) 6,506 6,591 6,637 6,715 - 6,507 6,508 - 
Daily wage (USD) 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 - 7.1 7.1 - 
Average well-being (HLY) 73 78 82 87 - 73 73 - 
Score (0-100) 47 55 65 75 - 47 47 - 
Note: ‘HLY’ denotes ‘Happy Life Years’; - denotes ‘not feasible.’ 
 
 
 
